

אנופתיות  
CARING

*A Feminine Approach To Ethics  
&  
Moral Education*

✻ NEL NODDINGS ✻

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley Los Angeles London 1986

It was the story of his soul, his unchanging soul. Once he mentioned the fact of his marriage to Carie, his wife. Once he listed the children he had had with her, but in the listing he forgot entirely a little son who lived to be five years old and was Carie's favorite child, and he made no comment on any of them.<sup>15</sup>

Yet all of her life Carie was made to feel spiritually inferior to her husband and, as she lay near death, he expressed concern about her soul!

Today we are asked to believe that women's "lack of experience in the world" keeps them at an inferior stage in moral development. I am suggesting, to the contrary, that a powerful and coherent ethic and, indeed, a different sort of world may be built on the natural caring so familiar to women.

### CIRCLES AND CHAINS

We find ourselves at the center of concentric circles of caring. In the inner, intimate circle, we care because we love. In particularly trying situations we may act out of ethical sense even here. After all, sometimes we are tired, the other has behaved abominably, and our love is frayed. Then we remind ourselves of the other's location in our system of circles: He is (was) my friend; she is my child; he is my father. The engrossment remains, although its color changes, and we may vacillate between the once natural caring for other to growing concern for ourselves.

As we move outward in the circles, we encounter those for whom we have personal regard. Here, as in the more intimate circles, we are guided in what we do by at least three considerations: how we feel, what the other expects of us, and what the situational relationship requires of us. Persons in these circles do not, in the usual course of events, require from us what our families naturally demand, and the situations in which we find ourselves have, usually, their own rules of conduct. We are comfortable in these circles if we are in compliance with the rules of the game. Again, these rules do not compel us, but they have an instrumental force that is easily recognized. I listen with a certain ready appreciation to colleagues, and I respond in a polite, acceptable fashion. But I must not forget that the rules are only aids to smooth passage through unproblematic events. They protect and insulate me. They are a reflection of someone's sense of relatedness institutionalized in our culture. But they do not put me in touch; they do not guarantee the relation itself. Thus rules will not be decisive for us in critical situations, but they will be

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acknowledged as economies of a sort. As such they will be even less important than the "illuminative maxims" described by Joseph Fletcher.<sup>16</sup> For us, the destructive role of rules and principles must be clarified and acknowledged.

Beyond the circles of proximate others are those I have not yet encountered. Some of these are linked to the inner circle by personal or formal relations. Out there is a young man who will be my daughter's husband; I am prepared to acknowledge the transitivity of my love. He enters my life with potential love. Out there, also, are future students; they are linked formally to those I already care for and they, too, enter my life potentially cared-for. Chains of caring are established, some linking unknown individuals to those already anchored in the inner circles and some forming whole new circles of potential caring. I am "prepared to care" through recognition of these chains.

But what of the stranger, one who comes to me without the bonds established in my chains of caring? Is there any sense in which I can be prepared to care for him? I can remain receptive. As in the beginning, I may recognize the internal "I must," that natural imperative that arises as I receive the other, but this becomes more and more difficult as my world grows more complex. I may be bombarded with stimuli that arouse the "I must," and I learn to reduce the load. As we have seen, a standard fashion of controlling what comes in is to rely on situational rules. These protect me. What, under normal circumstances, I must do for a colleague is different from what I must do for my child. I may come to rely almost completely on external rules and, if I do, I become detached from the very heart of morality: the sensibility that calls forth caring. In an important sense, the stranger has an enormous claim on me, because I do not know where he fits, what requests he has a formal right to make, or what personal needs he will pass on to me. I can meet him only in a state of wary anticipation and rusty grace, for my original innocent grace is gone and, aware of my finiteness, I fear a request I cannot meet without hardship. Indeed, the caring person, one who in this way is prepared to care, dreads the proximate stranger, for she cannot easily reject the claim he has on her. She would prefer that the stray cat not appear at the back door—or the stray teenager at the front. But if either presents himself, he must be received not by formula but as individual.

The strain on one who would care can be great. Literature is filled with descriptions of encounters of this sort: the legitimate dread of the one-caring and the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the internal "I must."



In all we discuss here, we shall be reminded of our fundamental relatedness, of our dependence upon each other. We are both free—that which I do, *I* do—and bound—I might do far better if you reach out to help me and far, far worse if you abuse, taunt, or ignore me. As we build an ethic on caring and as we examine education under its guidance, we shall see that the greatest obligation of educators, inside and outside formal schooling, is to nurture the ethical ideals of those with whom they come in contact.

#### THE ETHICAL IDEAL AND THE ETHICAL SELF

What is this "ethical ideal" I have referred to? When I reflect on the way I am in genuine caring relationships and caring situations—the natural quality of my engrossment, the shift of my energies toward the other and his projects—I form a picture of myself. This picture is incomplete so long as I see myself only as the one-caring. But as I reflect also on the way I am as cared-for, I see clearly my own longing to be received, understood, and accepted. There are cases in which I am not received, and many in which I fail to receive the other, but a picture of goodness begins to form. I see that when I am as I need the other to be toward me, I am the way I want to be—that is, I am closest to goodness when I accept and affirm the internal "I must." Now it is certainly true that the "I must" can be rejected and, of course, it can grow quieter under the stress of living. I can talk myself out of the "I must," detach myself from feeling and try to think my way to an ethical life. But this is just what I must not do if I value my ethical self.

This "goodness" to which I have referred is an assessment of the state of natural caring. I am not arguing that what *is* is of necessity *good*. I am arguing that natural caring—some degree of which each of us has been dependent upon for our continued existence—is the natural state that we inevitably identify as "good." This goodness is felt, and it guides our thinking implicitly. Our picture of ourselves as ethical inevitably involves a consideration of this goodness.

The ethical self is an active relation between my actual self and a vision of my ideal self as one-caring and cared-for. It is born of the fundamental recognition of relatedness; that which connects me naturally to the other, reconnects me through the other to myself. As I care for others and am cared for by them, I become able to care for myself. The characteristic "I must" arises in connection with this other in me, this ideal self,

and I respond to it. It is this caring that sustains me when caring for the other fails, and it is this caring that enables me to surpass my actual uncaring self in the direction of caring.

As my receiving the other enables the "I must" to arise with respect to the other, so receiving the vision of what I might be enables the "I must" to arise with respect to the ethical self. I see what I might be, and I see also that *this* vision of what I might be is the genuine product of caring. My acceptance and affirmation of this caring for self will not tell me exactly what to do, of course. Neither does caring in and of itself tell me what to do in behalf of the other. But as caring for another engrosses me in the other and redirects my motivational energy, so caring for my ethical self commits me to struggle toward the other through clouds of doubt, aversion, and apathy.

There are many problems that need to be explored in connection with the ethical ideal and its construction. As I shall use the expression, it refers to a personal construct, although there is a sense in which groups, too, may have an ethical ideal. I shall require that the ethical ideal be—in a way I must describe—realistic, attainable. It is constrained by what I have been and done and not fully described by what I am striving to be and do. If, for example, I have been jealous once, my ethical ideal reflects the image of a once-jealous woman striving to remain only-once jealous. An ethical ideal that is not constrained cannot be diminished but only discarded and replaced.

We may now anticipate two questions with which we shall wrestle a bit later. In response to the question why I should behave morally toward one about whom I do not care, we shall see that interest in, caring for, my ethical self induces the characteristic "I must." This interest in ethical self is not merely self-interest, although interest in the physical self is surely involved in the development of caring for the ethical self. If I did not care for my physical well-being, I would be unable to appreciate the efforts of those who care for me. I would have no vision of my own needs, fears, and desires by which to interpret the plight of the other and evaluate the accompanying "I must." Indeed, the "I must" might be pathologically afflicted in the absence of normal self-interest. But, clearly, interest in the ethical self surpasses self-interest. Caring for others does not arise out of it, but it arises out of caring for others.

Am I, then, suggesting that the answer to the question, "Why should I behave morally?" is "Because I am or want to be a moral person"? Roughly, this is the answer and can be the only one, but I shall try to

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#### RULES A

How can I meet the endless demands of behavior, of custom, and propose that rules of behavior are laid—that is, for others—it is clear those-who-would-care to fulfill long as I behave according to the in (and so long as those rules are am not likely to hurt those around consistently and automatically best seems to be focused on obtaining considered a "polite" person. Thus of gentle and pleasant interperso

show how this interest in moral behavior arises out of our natural impulse to care. At every level, in every situation, there are decisions to be made, and we are free to affirm or to reject the impulse to care. But our relatedness, our apprehension of happiness or misery in others, comes through immediately. We may reject what we feel, what we see clearly, but at the risk of separation not only from others but from our ideal selves.

It seems to me that a large part of the anguish that existentialist philosophers associate with our apprehension of freedom springs from our awareness of obligation and the endless claims that can be, and will be, made upon us. We feel that we are, on the one hand, free to decide; we know, on the other hand, that we are irrevocably linked to intimate others. This linkage, this fundamental relatedness, is at the very heart of our being. Thus I am totally free to reject the impulse to care, but I enslave myself to a particularly unhappy task when I make this choice. As I chop away at the chains that bind me to loved others, asserting my freedom, I move into a wilderness of strangers and loneliness, leaving behind all who cared for me and even, perhaps, my own self. I am not naturally alone. I am naturally in a relation from which I derive nourishment and guidance. When I am alone, either because I have detached myself or because circumstances have wrenched me free, I seek first and most naturally to reestablish my relatedness. My very individuality is defined in a set of relations. This is my basic reality.

#### RULES AND CONFLICTS

How can I meet the endless demands of caring? Here, interestingly, standards of behavior, of custom, come to my rescue. While we often suppose that rules of behavior are laid down for the benefit of the cared-for—that is, for others—it is clear that rules of behavior make it easier for those-who-would-care to fulfill the minimum requirements of caring. So long as I behave according to the general rules of the group I find myself in (and so long as those rules are not somehow offensive themselves), I am not likely to hurt those around me. But as we noted earlier, if I behave consistently and automatically by rule, I cannot be said to care. My interest seems to be focused on obtaining credit for caring. I want to be considered a “polite” person. Thus while the rules are instituted for the sake of gentle and pleasant interpersonal relations, and they are an enormous

boon to the one-caring whose energies are, after all, finite, I must know when to abandon rules and receive the cared-for directly. The rules of general conduct are accepted by one who is prepared to care out of regard for others but also in recognition of their time and energy saving usefulness.

I am also aided in meeting the burdens of caring by the reciprocal efforts of the cared-for. When my infant wriggles with delight as I bathe or feed him, I am aware of no burden but only a special delight of my own. Similarly, when I spend time in dialogue with my students, I am rewarded not only with appreciation but also with all sorts of information and insights. I could as easily, and properly, say, "I am receiving" as, "I am giving." Thus, many of the "demands" of caring are not felt as demands. They are, rather, the occasions that offer most of what makes life worth living. This, of course, does not surprise us. Caring, when it is the result of easy obedience to the natural impulse and to the state of engrossment already established, is not burdensome. But when we move beyond the natural circles of caring, we may begin to feel burdened. And even within the inner circle, conflicts of caring may arise. They are of several kinds.

In a very common—and sometimes deceptively simple—dilemma, we fall into conflict over the needs or wants of two different persons for whom we care. Consider Ms. Brown, who has promised to attend the symphony with her husband, and then their child comes down with an illness. Sometimes the decision is easy: the child is obviously too ill to leave, or the child is hardly ill at all and happily engaged in some activity. But often the dilemma is real, and we struggle with it. There is fever and, while there is no clear danger, the child keeps asking, "Mother, *must* you go?" The solution to this sort of conflict cannot be codified. Slogans such as "Put your husband (child) first!" are quite useless. There are times when he must come first; there are times when he cannot.

Is this problem a "moral" problem? In the important sense that it involves the needs and wants of others in relation or in conflict with our own, it certainly is and, without doubt, it is a problem of caring. When Ms. Brown looks at her child, she feels the immediate impulse to stay at home. The "I must" tells her to respond to the child's expressed need. When she looks at her husband and listens to him, she adds thinking to feeling; she, too, hates to miss the evening and "waste the tickets." She sees disappointment in his eyes and wants to respond to that. There is no probability calculus that will solve this problem for her. After analysis

and argument, and perhaps a period of anxiety eases, she has to decide whether to stay or go. She decides not by formula, nor by a simple rule, but by a weighing of factors. There is, as we have noted, no simple formula from the abstract formulation of the needs of the persons for whom she cares. Perhaps she receives his pain clearly and does not hurt; perhaps, at some deeper level, she does not hurt her best self. If she sees this, having decided to stay with the child, she may change her decision—and we all know how often decisions are proved wrong, for this is not the sort of decision labeled "right" or "wrong" and wrong according to how faithfully it corresponds to a genuine response to the perceived need.

Another sort of conflict arises when we realize that we cannot, in good faith, give attention to this sort of range from situations in which the sundae just before dinner to something that is deeply wrong. Again, as though we are talking to ourselves, we talk to ourselves. We usually operate. We ask ourselves for help and dependable aid to generally follow an imperative never to be violated.

Again, after analysis—sometimes we turn back to the persons at the center of the dilemma: the child who is begging for a sundae in many circumstances. But, then, we realize that the child, as well as the husband, just begs for attention. The child needs to know that he is more important than the sundae. We might just say this to him. We might just say, "I will get you a sundae at dinner anyway—let's do it!" When the child desires, the tendency toward playing the child off against the sundae reveals the desired sundae with our own view reveals nothing very important. The child's view reveals nothing very important to the child with eyes brightened by attention. When we interact in this way with the child, the child is spoiled. Rather, when we have to choose between reasons are worth his attention.



and argument, and perhaps a period of watchfulness to see if the child's anxiety eases, she has to decide. When she decides, if she cares, she decides not by formula, nor by a process of strict "rational decision making." There is, as we have noted before, a turning point. She turns away from the abstract formulation of the problem and looks again at the persons for whom she cares. Perhaps her child is still anxious and irritable; she receives his pain clearly. Perhaps her husband is merely annoyed, not hurt; perhaps, at some deeper level, he too wants only support for his best self. If she sees this, having received both persons, she decides to stay with the child. If the child is sound asleep one-half hour after the decision—and we all know how likely this is—her decision is not thereby proved wrong, for this is not the sort of decision that can properly be labeled "right" or "wrong" according to the outcome. It is right or wrong according to how faithfully it was rooted in caring—that is, in a genuine response to the perceived needs of the others.

Another sort of conflict arises when the cared-for wants something that we cannot, in good faith, give him or help him to attain. Conflicts of this sort range from situations involving a child's desire for a strawberry sundae just before dinner to suggestions or commands that we find deeply wrong. Again, as thoughtful persons committed to rational deliberation, we talk to ourselves. We examine the implicit rules by which we usually operate. We ask ourselves whether the rule is a guideline, a useful and dependable aid to generally acceptable behavior, or whether it is an imperative never to be violated by us.

Again, after analysis—sometimes brief, sometimes long and agonizing—we turn back to the persons and the concrete situations. In the case of the child who is begging for a sundae, we may properly refuse him under many circumstances. But, then, there are times when the situation (as well as the child) just begs for an infraction of the rule. Perhaps the child needs to know that he is more important than the rule. We do not have to say this to him. We might just say, "Well, I wasn't planning much of a dinner anyway—let's do it!" When we care, the humor, the harmless desires, the tendency toward playfulness of the cared-for enter us. We see the desired sundae with our own eyes and with the child's. If our own view reveals nothing very important and even seems a bit stuffy, we turn to the child with eyes brightened and refreshed with delight. Interestingly, when we interact in this way with a child, he is not likely to become spoiled. Rather, when we have to say no, he is likely to believe that our reasons are worth his attention. We shall discuss situations of this sort

more fully when we consider the cared-for and his role in caring.

But suppose the situation is more serious. Suppose the cared-for wants us to participate in some activity we regard as wrong. Clearly, if an open-minded analysis leaves our evaluation unchanged, we cannot participate. What sort of thinking does the one-caring do in such a situation? Must she turn away from persons and toward some principle?

Let's consider an example. Professor A receives a research proposal from graduate student B. B proposes to do research that requires deceiving the subjects involved in the research. A would not, herself, propose such research. She is prepared to care for these subjects and fears possible bad effects on them. But she knows B and cares for him. She can feel the anxiety with which B approaches her: the pride in a well-written proposal, the fear that months will have been wasted, the eagerness to get on with the job. Proximity, as we have seen, is powerful in caring. A is in direct contact with B, but she is not in direct contact with the still-to-be-chosen subjects. She cannot be sure that they would be hurt by the experiment. Perhaps it is harmless. Perhaps there is no other way to answer the question B has raised. What should A do?

There are several approaches to problems of this sort. A might put her feelings about the research aside and concentrate on the possible outcomes. What adverse effects might occur? How likely are they? How significant is the question that guides the experiment? This is a rational approach that leads A to consider "average subjects," probabilities, and utilities. Thinking of this sort can be valuable, because some great utility may be discovered and, if it is, its consideration may induce a change in A's attitudes. But we see that, while this sounds plausible, if great utility were embedded in the question, A probably would have seen it at the outset. This approach, unless it is moderated by frequent "turnings," might easily lead A beyond rational thinking to mere rationalization. If, however, A takes the view of one-caring, she will attempt to visualize concrete subjects. Instead of "average subjects" she will consider real persons about whom she cares. And she will look at the situation from two perspectives: How might C, a known and loved other, react to the proposed deception? How do I feel about C's being thus deceived? This kind of thinking keeps A in contact with the particular, the concrete, the personal. It can be decisive, but we note that A's thinking did not proceed from a principle nor will it, of necessity, lead to one, although it might. The dangers that A perceives during her reflection may be so great, and her own revulsion so strong, that she will be led to propose guidelines for

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the control of all research that requires deception. But this need not be the case. The one-caring is wary of rules and principles. She formulates and holds them loosely, tentatively, as economies of a sort, but she insists upon holding closely to the concrete. She wants to maintain and to exercise her receptivity. Further, she sees the potential weakness in her own form of thinking: When she substitutes the concrete "C" for "subject" in B's research, she opens the channels to her own feeling. But to get an accurate picture of the effects on the cared-for, C must be a legitimate substitution (someone to whom this could actually happen), and A must evaluate C's reactions realistically. Clearly, there is danger in this concretization, also, and the one-caring is unwilling to formulate principles on the basis of her concrete experience.

We have been looking at the conflicts of caring, and we have seen that conflict may arise between the perceived need of one person and the desire of another; between what the cared-for wants and what we see as his best interest; between the wants of the cared-for and the welfare of persons yet unknown. We may even find ourselves in conflict between two persons for whom we care and whose interests and beliefs are incompatible. Sometimes, the conflict cannot be resolved and must simply be lived. A host of examples comes to mind. Consider parents during a civil war whose sons choose opposite sides; they are, themselves, neutral. Consider the woman who lives next door to a known Mafia mobster. She knows what the man is in the larger world, what effects his activities have on unknown, potential cared-fors. But she has also seen his tenderness to his own children, his respectability in neighborhood matters, his kindness as a neighbor. And then someone comes to the door and asks for information that she can give. What should she do? The answer is by no means clear to me. Many of us would, in great relief, turn to a principle, but I am not going to suggest that. I am not suggesting, either, that we embrace a code of family or tribe to which we adhere rigidly; such a move would, clearly, be even less consonant with caring than an adherence to principle in a larger world. Nor am I suggesting that crimes not be reported when they involve persons we know and care for. I am suggesting, rather, that rules cannot guide us infallibly in situations of conflict, and I am suggesting strongly that we have no ethical responsibility to cooperate with law or government when it attempts to involve us in unethical procedures. Spying, infiltration, entrapment, betrayal are all anathema to one-caring, and she cannot justify them on the basis of principle. The suggestion that she should participate in such activities is met

by a firm, "This I will not do," delivered not in obedience to a principle but in faithfulness to the fundamental relatedness that induces caring.

Is the one-caring, then, a capricious and unprincipled character who is swayed this way and that by intensity, proximity, and the conditions of the moment? As our picture unfolds more completely, we shall see that moral life based on caring is coherent, although it may defy description in terms of systematic consistency. It is swayed, but not determined, by intensity, proximity, and temporal conditions. The one-caring is dependable, not capricious. Her principles are guides to behavior, and she sees clearly that their function is largely to simplify situations, to prevent hundreds of similar questions from arising. She sees, also, that they may be of little use if a serious question actually arises.

This is enormously tricky, and perhaps we should consider another example. Suppose the one-caring has decided that she will not steal. She has come to this general rule or principle after more deliberation than I can record here, and the decision is firm. Once she has made the decision, temptation does not arise. Stealing is beneath her; it does not befit the picture she has formed of her ethical self. But, while the decision is firm and clear—and simplifies life greatly—it is not ultimate, not absolute, and the one-caring knows this. The chances are excellent that the one-caring, in the kinds of situations those of us participating in this dialogue are likely to face, will never steal. But, related as she is by the basic bonds of life, she will not place principle where it cannot possibly hold. It is too fragile to stay her hand in the presence of, say, a hungry child, a hungry friend, a hungry stranger. Thus, while the one-caring may lead a life described by others as "highly principled," she is herself peculiarly wary of principles. She will not easily be distracted from the dynamic and complex events of concrete life by promises of abstract simplicity and permanence. Indeed, as we shall see, she might prefer to explain her abstinence from stealing without reference to a principle at all.

The example we just considered is one that may easily win virtually universal assent. Decisions of the sort may be reached not only by one-caring but by the sophisticated moral thinker using principles deductively. Perhaps another example should be considered. Suppose that I give my son permission to stay home from school in order to do something both of us consider worthwhile. I must write a note explaining his absence. If I do not say that he was ill, he will be punished with detention. The school has such a rule because it is dependent on state funds, and those funds are withheld for absences other than those due to illness

or death. The school thus prefers to say that he was because not say I may choose to lie regularly in than as one conforming to principle behavior on the grounds that to cause my behavior is not prima facie that excuse. One who does argue—to get it changed—or to live in I can brush off the whole debate ideal of one-caring.

I shall leave this result in its male colleague may insist that that I must justify telling a lie admitting if I engage in such an obedience or rejection of principle are paramount in ethical life. I be content with the observation ing. Indeed, if he pushes me, how he might justify hurting his his argument will take. It will at loggerheads.

The form of moral decision more powerfully illustrated in brother, Enrique. When he was fighting in the Spanish army, I want to kill or to risk being killed. Now, one might also arrive at on principles but, clearly, in a plausibly arrive at the opposite of imminent danger to loved ones arguing from principles, one of that prompts the justification. the decision. This is the ultimate that we shall try to avoid by in feelings, longings, fears, hope

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or death. The school thus prefers to hear that my son was ill. I prefer to say that he was because not saying it will cause my son to be punished. So I may choose to lie regularly in order to meet my son as one-caring rather than as one conforming to principle. I do not attempt to justify my behavior on the grounds that the absence rule is foolish and unfair, because my behavior is not primarily constrained by rules. I do not need that excuse. One who does argue thus is obliged, I think, to fight the rule—to get it changed—or to live in some deceit. I do not have this problem. I can brush off the whole debate as foolishness and remain faithful to the ideal of one-caring.

I shall leave this result in its stark, and perhaps shocking, form. My male colleague may insist that I must justify my actions—in particular, that I must justify telling a lie. But need I do this, and what will I be admitting if I engage in such an attempt? If I attempt to justify every disobedience or rejection of principle, I tacitly acknowledge that principles are paramount in ethical life. He will have won his main case. So I shall be content with the observation that there has been no violation of caring. Indeed, if he pushes me, I shall turn the argument about and ask how he might justify hurting his son by telling the truth. I know the form his argument will take. It will put principle over person, and we shall be at loggerheads.

The form of moral decision making that I have suggested is, perhaps, more powerfully illustrated in a story told of Pablo Casals's younger brother, Enrique. When he was young and faced with the prospect of fighting in the Spanish army, he confessed to his mother that he did not want to kill or to risk being killed. "Then run away," advised his mother. Now, one might also arrive at this decision through a chain of reasoning on principles but, clearly, in reasoning on principles one might just as plausibly arrive at the opposite decision. The one-caring, in the absence of imminent danger to loved ones, can make only one decision. In arguing from principles, one often suppresses the basic feeling or longing that prompts the justification. One is led to suppose that reason produces the decision. This is the ultimate and tragic dishonesty, and it is the one that we shall try to avoid by insisting upon a clear-eyed inspection of our feelings, longings, fears, hopes, dreams.

Now, this entire book is about caring and so, in an important sense, about the one-caring. In this chapter, I have concentrated on the inner dynamics of caring: on the constitutive engrossment and receptivity, on the consequent displacement of motivational energy, on the circles and

chains that reflect and sustain the caring, and on the conflicts of caring. We have discussed what it means to care genuinely about self and how caring for the ethical self sustains us through periods of lapsed caring, and we have hinted at the role caring plays in ethical behavior.

But caring is a relationship that contains another, the cared-for, and we have already suggested that the one-caring and the cared-for are reciprocally dependent. We shall not leave the one-caring but shall look at the relationship next through the eyes of the cared-for.

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## THE CARED-FOR

### THE ONE-CARING'S ATTITUDE AND ITS EFFECTS

**T**HE ONE-CARING comes across to the cared-for in an attitude. Whatever she does, she conveys to the cared-for that she cares. If she is in conversation with a colleague, she listens, and her eyes reflect the seriousness, humor, or excitement of the message being spoken. If she tends the sick, her hands are gentle with the anticipation of pain and discomfort. If she comforts the night-terrered child, her embrace shields from both terror and ridicule. She feels the excitement, pain, terror, or embarrassment of the other and commits herself to act accordingly. She is present to the cared-for. Her attitude is one of receptivity. But there is a receptivity required of the cared-for also.

Suppose that a child of, say, eight years comes home from school angry. He storms into the kitchen and throws his books on the floor. His mother, startled, says, "What happened, honey?" (She resists the temptation to say something to the effect that "in this house we do not throw things.") The child says that his teacher is "impossible," "completely unfair," "mean," "stupid," and so on. His mother sympathizes and probes gently for what happened. Gradually, under the quiet influence of a receptive listener, the child calms down. As his mother sympathizes, he may even relax enough to say, "Well, it wasn't that bad," in answer to his mother's sympathetic outrage. Then the two may smile at each other and explore rational solutions; they can speculate about faults, mistakes, and intentions. They can plot a course of action for the future. The child, accepted and supported, can begin to examine his own role in the incident and, perhaps, even suggest how he might have behaved differently.

The receptivity of the one-caring need not lead to permissiveness nor to an abdication of responsibility for conduct and achievement. Rather, it maintains and enhances the relatedness that is fundamental to human

reality and, in education, it sets the stage for the teacher's effort in maintaining and increasing the child's receptive capacity. As the teacher receives the child and works with him on cooperatively designed projects, as she resists the temptation—or the mandate—to manipulate the child, to squeeze him into some mold, she establishes a climate of receptivity. The one-caring reflects reality as she sees it to the child. She accepts him as she hopes he will accept himself—seeing what is there, considering what might be changed, speculating on what might be. But the commitment, the decision to embrace a particular possibility, must be the child's. Her commitment is to him. While she expresses herself honestly when his vision of himself is unlovely and enthusiastically when it is beautiful, she never reflects a reality that pictures him detached, alone, abandoned. If her standards seem mysterious at times to outsiders, they are not so to the cared-for who has participated in their construction.

We shall return again and again to a discussion of receptivity. It is in the relaxation of detached and objective self, in this engrossment, that the one-caring assumes her full individuality in relatedness. The child who retains his receptivity can lose himself not only in others for whom he becomes one-caring, but also in ideas and objects. The teacher who encourages receptivity wants the child to look, to listen, to touch and, perhaps, to receive a vision of reality. When we speak of receiving reality, we do not deny that each human consciousness participates in the construction of reality, but we give proper emphasis to the relatedness that must be perceived and accepted before any coherent picture can be constructed. The other is received, his reality is apprehended as possibility for oneself. The object is received; its reality stands out against the background of its possibilities in the one receiving.

One learns to participate in cycles. At one stage, things are allowed to enter with little restriction; a reservoir of images and energy is stored up. Then a focusing takes place; the energies are made dense, brought sharply to focus on a point of interest. Then a diffusion may occur. The energy is converted to light and scattered over the entire field of interest illuminating elements and ground. The field is now characterized by coherence and grace. Both initial and final stages may be characterized as receptive. In the first we receive what is there; in the last, we receive what-is-there in relation to what-is-here. We see how we are related to this object to which we are related. We shall return to these matters in some detail when we discuss *caring for ideas*.

The cared-for responds to the presence of the one-caring. He feels the

difference between being received ever the one-caring actually doingful or meaningless, in the attitude is not something thought although, of course, either one-ance of self to other, a continuous to new individual to new dual caring nor the perception of attitude neither is reasoned. While much carefully thought out, the basic required awareness of relatedness caring is recognized by, for example claims: "In order to develop, involvement of one or more adults child." In answer to what he "Somebody has got to be crazy."

The child about whom no one for teachers. Obviously, the teacher child; the notion loses its force provide an environment in which which children not passionately perhaps, learn to respond to and them. Such a child may herself child even though she herself w

Now, of course, philosopher "crazy" about a child is not necessarily ner's way of talking nevertheless ing relationship in which a child is, it is fundamentally nonrational ing processes, however rational tions, the commitment that eliminates gives it personal meaning. We activities to share with our child plan"; we do not, for example, will be able to name and describe we decide more or less spontaneously because we remember our own anticipate delight in sharing the children learn things through v



difference between being received and being held off or ignored. Whatever the one-caring actually does is enhanced or diminished, made meaningful or meaningless, in the attitude conveyed to the cared-for. This attitude is not something thought by either the one-caring or the cared-for although, of course, either one may think about it. It is a total conveyance of self to other, a continual transformation of individual to duality to new individual to new duality. Neither the engrossment of the one-caring nor the perception of attitude by the cared-for is rational; that is, neither is reasoned. While much of what goes on in caring is rational and carefully thought out, the basic relationship is not, and neither is the required awareness of relatedness. The essentially nonrational nature of caring is recognized by, for example, Urie Bronfenbrenner when he claims: "In order to develop, a child needs the enduring, irrational involvement of one or more adults in care and joint activity with the child." In answer to what he means by "irrational," he explains: "Somebody has got to be crazy about that kid!"

The child about whom no one is "crazy" presents a special problem for teachers. Obviously, the teacher cannot be "crazy about" every child; the notion loses its force spread so thin. But the teacher can try to provide an environment in which affection and support are enhanced, in which children not passionately loved will at least receive attention and, perhaps, learn to respond to and encourage those who genuinely address them. Such a child may herself someday be "crazy about" some other child even though she herself was never the recipient of such affection.

Now, of course, philosophers are certain to point out that being "crazy" about a child is not necessarily irrational. But Bronfenbrenner's way of talking nevertheless makes an essential point about the caring relationship in which a child thrives. It is at bottom not rational; that is, it is fundamentally nonrational. However rational the decision making processes, however rational the investigation of means-ends relations, the commitment that elicits the rational activity precedes it and gives it personal meaning. We do not usually, as caring parents, select activities to share with our children on the basis of some "learning plan"; we do not, for example, take our children to the zoo so that they will be able to name and describe ten animals native to Africa. Rather, we decide more or less spontaneously to spend an afternoon at the zoo, because we remember our own childish pleasure in such occasions and anticipate delight in sharing the experience with our children. That our children learn things through visits to zoos, museums, national monu-

ments, and the like is something we all take for granted but, for most of us, the potential learning is not what motivates the visits. We often find ourselves in teaching-learning situations with our children, but these arise naturally in the companionable relationship established through caring. We commit ourselves to our children.

Bronfenbrenner suggests, further, that children embraced in such non-rational relationships gain competence; that is, they become able to master situations of greater and greater complexity through their cooperative participation with adults. When parent and child work together on various projects over a period of time, the child gradually becomes competent in more and more tasks constituting the project. The parent who cares, who receives the child, allows him to take hold of what he can do. She does not keep him in a subservient position but welcomes his growing competence and independence.

We hear the word "competence" often these days. We hear it in the context of competency based education (CBE) and in reference to competence tests for high school graduation. But "competence" in these contexts refers more accurately to performance, to a demonstrated mastery of prespecified and discrete tasks. "Competence" as I am using it points to a global mastery of conditions in one's personal or professional environment and, indirectly, to the desire for such mastery. The psychologist Robert White suggests that the desire for competence is innate; that is, human beings naturally experience what may be termed "effectance motivation." He notes that activity thus engaged produces a feeling of efficacy:

... it is maintained that competence cannot be fully acquired simply through behavior instigated by drives. It receives substantial contributions from activities which, though playful and exploratory in character, at the same time show direction, selectivity, and persistence in interacting with the environment. Such activities in the ultimate service of competence must therefore be conceived to be motivated in their own right.<sup>3</sup>

Small children practice going up and down stairs, turning lights and faucets on and off, dropping things and retrieving them. All of these activities, which seem to adults repetitiously boring and even annoying, are engaged in for the sake of mastering the environment. The competent individual enjoys a sense of control over the objects and events with which he regularly comes in contact.

If this is right, we can see the importance of arranging the environment

appropriately for growing child motivation, the challenge must be too great, the child may avoid it entirely or to meet its purpose of terminating it. Failure is a usual strategy in schools. If, on the other hand, the child may become bored at this time to perfunctory performance.

The one-caring receives the child with the eyes. Martin Buber calls this "I-Thou" caring assumes a dual perspective, that of the caring and that of the cared-for. The educational environment for the child is not to resort to descriptions of the child. Educators do exactly this. They are interested in their own surrounding world rather than in the person for including a study of the child and for excluding studies of the child. It is often deadening. The one-caring is not interested in the child—the parent's educational environment according to Dewey's was greater than the child's. Building educational strategy is not the leading out of experience but what he pleases; it suggests that the child pleases. That means that the child is that the child will be challenged in various situations. The initial judgment is that the child will be challenged in various situations.

But there is another, vital perspective. "Because it pleases me" is rather than "because it pleases the child." Better think here of what we choose for our children. The reasons we might give for our children to learn what he initially finds interesting. We saw in the last chapter how we can betray our loved ones if we are not against us. How, then, can we choose for our child will learn what he chooses. Sometimes choose against ourselves. We make us proud of ourselves. We

appropriately for growing children. To call forth a natural effectance motivation, the challenge must be within the optimal range. If the challenge is too great, the child may become frustrated and look for a way to avoid it entirely or to meet it—however unsatisfactorily—for the mere purpose of terminating it. Failing just to “get it over with” is not an unusual strategy in schools. If, on the other hand, the challenge is too slight, the child may become bored and, again, his approach may deteriorate—this time to perfunctory performance.

The one-caring receives the child and views his world through both sets of eyes. Martin Buber calls this relational process “inclusion.”<sup>4</sup> The one-caring assumes a dual perspective and can see things from both her own pole and that of the cared-for. If this were not so, arranging an educational environment for the child would be very difficult. One would have to resort to descriptions of the child as abstraction and, indeed, many educators do exactly this. They say such things as “Children are interested in their own surroundings,” and use this pronouncement as a reason for including a study of the neighborhood in beginning social studies and for excluding studies of foreign lands and ancient times. The result is often deadening. The one-caring, on the other hand, watches for incipient interest in the child—the particular, concrete child—and arranges the educational environment accordingly. Possibly no insight of John Dewey’s was greater than that which reveals the vital importance of building educational strategy on the purposes of the child. The principle of the leading out of experience does not imply letting the child learn what he pleases; it suggests that, inescapably, the child will learn what he pleases. That means that the educator must arrange the effective world so that the child will be challenged to master significant tasks in significant situations. The initial judgment of significance is the teacher’s task.

But there is another, vital aspect to “learning what one pleases.” “Because it pleases me” is rarely our basic reason for acting. We might better think here of what we choose to do and consider the kinds of reasons we might give for our choices. A child—or anyone—can be forced to learn what he initially finds uninteresting or even repugnant. Indeed, we saw in the last chapter how we may be forced to deny our principles and betray our loved ones if sufficiently terrible tactics are employed against us. How, then, can we support a position that insists that the child will learn what he chooses? The answer lies in recognizing that we sometimes choose against ourselves. We give way for reasons that do not make us proud of ourselves. We concoct reasons that are

far removed from our normal pattern of motivation or, in the most dreadful situations, we act directly and unreflectively to preserve what we can of our physical or public selves. We deteriorate, and our ethical ideals are diminished. But we still choose, and recognition of the choice induces a new agony. I am in the sleazy motive, the panicked betrayal, the reluctant obedience.

The educator or parent, then, is not powerless. On the contrary, her power is awesome. Somehow the child must be led to choose for himself and not against himself, and this means that he will choose not only for his physical self but, more importantly, for his ethical self.

The child, as one cared-for, will often respond with interest to challenges proffered by the one-caring, if the one-caring is loved and trusted by the child. As an initial impulse to engage particular subject matter, love for the adult and the desire to imitate her are powerful inducements. Further, working together on tasks makes it possible for the child to accept greater challenges and to maintain a high level of effectance motivation. What is conveyed to the child is that there is something delightful about the companionship that continues through every stage of developing competence. At the earliest stages, a young child is not much help in, say, preparing meals. But he can do some things: he can hand me a spoon, poke the Jello to see if it has set, pat the hamburgers flat. He can share with me the sights, smells, sounds, tastes, and textures encountered in working with foods. As he watches me and helps me, he is learning the names of things, acquiring a sense of orderliness, learning to recognize phenomena such as boiling, thickening, and the like. After a while he can pour milk, crack eggs without squashing them, sift flour, and take turns stirring the batter. Eventually, he can prepare individual dishes and take responsibility for whole meals. Through all of these stages, there is mutual pleasure not only in the child's growing competence, but also in the shared activities and their products.

It would be easy to spend several chapters talking about what children can learn through working with their parents in food preparation, but our main interest here is the attitude of the one-caring and how it affects the cared-for. The child is encouraged to try by the acceptance of the parent, and he is made to feel a partner in the enterprise. As we shall see later, the parent's attitude goes beyond acceptance to what Buber calls "confirmation." The one-caring sees the best self in the cared-for and works with him to actualize that self. The child is affected not only by his parent's attitude toward him, but also by her attitudes toward a multi-

tude of objects and events. She has duties. She may show an appreciation for vegetables or she may be indifferent to them. She may play or both. The kitchen may be a place of joy. More important than anything else, he must come, whether he is seen as a c-

#### APPREHENSION OF CARING RELATIONSHIP

This attitude of warm acceptance is characteristic of caring relationships. We are primarily interested in these relationships, but it is clear that through the apprehension of caring, the one who is missed, the one who is the object of care, is being treated, handled by the one-caring in a way that is the natural effectance motivation.

A mother recounts the story of a child who was seen by counselors and administrators. The child, a very bright daughter, had been skipped a grade because of illness and, during her long absence, had advanced well beyond her grade placement. The parents, with both the studies and the child's behavior, were quite naturally, feared that the child would be entirely, and so they requested the counselors to receive them in a physically comfortable setting. They spoke of their parents' lack of presence. They spoke of their parents' desire to push their children to the limit. The counselors estimate their children's abilities and the child's "damages their social competence" and become more and more frustrated. The child quickly came smiling responses and said, "I think your child is exceptional." The counselors suggested that the matter be left to the child's psychologist. Fortunately (things could have been worse), the psychologist recommended that the child be supported the recommendation and that the child be socially and emotionally advanced.

tude of objects and events. She may treat meals as celebrations or as duties. She may show an appreciation for the beauty of fresh fruits and vegetables or she may be indifferent to them. Cooking may be work or play or both. The kitchen may be clean or dirty, attractive or dreary. More important than anything else, however, is whether the child is welcome, whether he is seen as a contributing person.

#### APPREHENSION OF CARING NECESSARY TO THE CARING RELATIONSHIP; UNEQUAL MEETINGS

This attitude of warm acceptance and trust is important in all caring relationships. We are primarily interested in parent-child and teacher-student relationships, but it is clear that caring is completed in all relationships through the apprehension of caring by the cared-for. When this attitude is missed, the one who is the object of caretaking feels like an object. He is being treated, handled by formula. When it is present and recognized, the natural effectance motivation is enhanced.

A mother recounts the story of an upsetting experience with school counselors and administrators. She and her husband requested that their very bright daughter be skipped a grade. The child had suffered two serious illnesses and, during her long bed stay, had read, studied, and written well beyond her grade placement. On returning to school, she was bored with both the studies and the childishness of her classmates. The parents, quite naturally, feared that their child would lose interest in school entirely, and so they requested a special hearing. The school team received them in a physically cordial manner that quickly revealed a total lack of presence. They spoke patronizingly of how "all professional parents want to push their children," of how doting parents tend to "overestimate their children's abilities," of how the practice of skipping children "damages their social competence." The parents, of course, became more and more frustrated. The harder they tried to explain, the more quickly came smiling responses: "We understand." "Of course." "You think your child is exceptional." Finally, in utter frustration, the couple suggested that the matter be left to an evaluation of the school psychologist. Fortunately (things could have turned out differently), the school psychologist recommended that the child be advanced. Three reasons supported the recommendation: The child was large for her age, she was socially and emotionally advanced, and she exhibited a tested I.Q. over

160. These parents have never since been comfortable with school officials and school rulings, and they have assumed primary responsibility for the education of their children.

To be talked at by people for whom we do not exist, as Marcel points out, throws us back upon ourselves. To be treated as "types" instead of individuals, to have strategies exercised on us, objectifies us. We become "cases" instead of persons. Those of us who are able to escape such situations do so with alacrity, but escape is not always possible, and for some of us it is rarely possible. The fact is that many of us have been reduced to cases by the very machinery that has been instituted to care for us.

It is not easy for one entrusted with a helping function to care. A difference of status and the authorization to help prevent an equal meeting between helper and the one helped. In a dialogue with Carl Rogers, Martin Buber emphasizes this point:

... A man coming to you for help. . . . The essential difference between your role in this situation and his is obvious. He comes for help to you. You don't come for help to him. And not only this, but you are *able*, more or less, to help him. He can do different things to you, but not to help you. And not this alone. You *see* him, *really*. I don't mean that you cannot be mistaken, but you *see* him, . . . he cannot, by far, cannot *see* you.<sup>5</sup>

In this discussion, Buber was, of course, acknowledging the legitimacy and—more importantly—the sensitivity of Rogers's therapy. Not every helper sees the patient or client. Indeed, we just reviewed a case in which the counselors were totally absent to the struggling clients. But even if the therapist is sensitive and receptive, Buber points out that the fact of his or her authorization to help gets in the way of an equal meeting. Social worker and client, physician and patient, counselor and student in their formal roles necessarily meet each other unequally. Insofar as the client, patient, and student are part of their work load, professionals may even find it desirable "to forget" them at the end of the workday. To think of them, to be engrossed in them, would be to take their "work" home. But to think this way is to misunderstand the nature of engrossment in caring. It misses the potentiality and latency that characterize caring.

It is not only the authorization to help or to instruct that makes unequal meetings in therapy or teaching inevitable. It is also the nature of the cared-for's situation. The patient needs help; the student needs instruction or information or interpretation. The teacher as one-caring needs to see from both her own perspective and that of the student in

order to teach—in order to make inclusion is part of teaching successful. If inclusion fails as a teacher. The teacher is freed by the act of projects to pursue those projects for the personal development of the student. He says that mutual inclusion is a teacher-student toward friendship between teacher and student, of the teacher and student as student.

It is only through inclusion that the teacher is confirmed. I must see the cared-for envision his best self—in order to be received by the cared-for as caring. It is at inclusion and confirmation that the teacher firms. It does not "accept" a student that leads upward. It is in the act of caring that the teacher delights.

So far, we have been discussing the nature of caring which conveys the caring attitude of acceptance and confirmation, of "equal meetings," and we have considered the nature of child relationships and helping relationships in an informal phenomenon. We have seen the participants within them find a way to keep sight of the logic of our caring. It is important, also, to recognize the nature of much of what has been claimed.

I have claimed that the cared-for's received attitude of the one-caring is found in many sources. It is especially in the evidence is clear that the received attitude of the one-caring has observable effects in the "cared-for." One case cannot be conclusive. Many researchers—among them—have found present evidence that even the received attitude or rejection in its mother may be induced in children, and that the attitudes of rejection can be found

order to teach—in order to meet the needs of the student. Achieving inclusion is part of teaching successfully, and one who cannot practice inclusion fails as a teacher. The student, however, achieves his ends without inclusion. He is freed by the teacher's engrossment in him and his projects to pursue those projects without considering their significance for the personal development of the teacher. I think Buber is right when he says that mutual inclusion moves a relationship away from that of teacher-student toward friendship. Occasional equal meetings may occur between teacher and student, of course, but the meetings between teacher as teacher and student as student are necessarily and generously unequal.

It is only through inclusion that the parent or teacher can practice confirmation. I must see the cared-for as he is and as he might be—as he envisions his best self—in order to confirm him. The attitude that is perceived by the cared-for as caring is generated by efforts of the one-caring at inclusion and confirmation. It is an attitude that both accepts and confirms. It does not "accept" and shrug off. It accepts, embraces, and leads upward. It questions, it responds, it sympathizes, it challenges, it delights.

So far, we have been discussing an attitude on the part of the one-caring which conveys the caring to the cared-for. We have spoken of acceptance and confirmation, of receiving, of inclusion, and of "unequal meetings," and we have considered some examples in the area of parent-child relationships and helper-client relationships. I have been proceeding in an informal phenomenological way, exploring situations and how the participants within them feel and see things. But it is important to keep sight of the logic of our concept of caring as it is being developed, and it is important, also, to recognize that there is empirical evidence for much of what has been claimed.

I have claimed that the cared-for "grows" and "glows" under the perceived attitude of the one-caring. Support for such claims can be found in many sources. It is especially impressive in the negative; that is, the evidence is clear that the rejection characteristic of non-caring has observable effects in the "cared-for." Although the evidence from any one case cannot be conclusive, it is overwhelming in its collective form. Many researchers—among them, Sanger,<sup>6</sup> Montagu,<sup>7</sup> and Wengraf<sup>8</sup>—present evidence that even the fetus is affected by the attitude of acceptance or rejection in its mother. A review of the undesirable effects that may be induced in children, both prenatal and postnatal, by maternal attitudes of rejection can be found in Edward Pohlman's discussion on

birth planning.<sup>9</sup> Further, the attitude itself seems to be causal. Zilboorg says that it "has its rather mysterious ways of conveying itself to the child and provoking a considerable number of undesirable and at time directly pathological reactions."<sup>10</sup>

By "mysterious ways," Zilboorg and other researchers mean that it is an attitude that itself seems to do the mischief. Sears, for example, found few significant differences in child rearing practices between accepting and rejecting parents,<sup>11</sup> and a similar conclusion was reached by Schaefer and Bell.<sup>12</sup> But behavioral differences were found in the children. Hence a claim that attitude is crucial to an analysis of caring, that feeling is somehow conveyed directly, is partially supported empirically.

In addition to providing empirical support for what we see reflectively in a phenomenological view, I want to provide a logical analysis of the caring relation. I have claimed that the perception by the cared-for of an attitude of caring on the part of the one-caring is partially constitutive of caring. It and its successful impact on the cared-for are necessary to caring. Does this mean that I cannot be said to care for X if X does not recognize my caring? In the fullest sense, I think we have to accept this result. By looking closely at caring from the view of the one-caring, from the position of the cared-for, and from the perspective of a third-person observer, we see pictures of caring that are potentially conflicting and yet, at bottom, complementary. The third-person aspect will be important for us when we consider institutional problems of caring, but it does not enter or alter the essential description of caring. Caring involves two parties: the one-caring and the cared-for. It is complete when it is fulfilled in both. We are tempted to say that the caring attitude is characteristic of caring, that when one cares, she characteristically exhibits an attitude. But, then, it could be missed by the cared-for. Suppose I claim to care for X, but X does not believe that I care for him. If I meet the first-person requirements of caring for X, I am tempted to insist that I do care—that there is something wrong with X that he does not appreciate my caring. But if you are looking at this relationship, you would have to report, however reluctantly, that something is missing. X does not feel that I care. Therefore, sadly, I must admit that, while I feel that I care, X does not perceive that I care and, hence, the relationship cannot be characterized as one of caring. This result does not necessarily signify a negligence on my part. There are limits in caring. X may be paranoid or otherwise pathological. There may be no way for my caring to reach him. But, then, caring has been only partly actualized.

It may seem paradoxical to some that my caring should be in any way

dependent on the other. A teaching. Some analysts find conceptually dependent on learning a sensical one. Aristotle noted actualization in another. So, that caring is completed in reception, incredible nor incomprehensible, prepared to care, and not even attaches. But in recognizing relation is an ellipsis of sorts: solely to be credited or blamed.

Logically, we have the following if and only if

i) W cares for X (as described)

ii) X recognizes that W cares

When we say that "X recognizes" receives the caring honestly. deny it. Hence, its reception when she receives the cared-for and a fourth, as in, "W is aware that . . .," and so on.

Caring requires the typical element in W and, also, the reciprocal relationship can be mutually and X and retain true expression of caring, and it has the merit may arise in such a situation care for X," even if I must relationship.

We must turn now to a problem that of reciprocity. Later, with caring for ideas, concerned with reciprocity in terms for. We have already noted that. But what is the nature of the

What part does the cared-



dependent on the other. A similar difficulty arises in the analysis of teaching. Some analysts find it unacceptable to pronounce teaching conceptually dependent on learning. Still, this position is clearly not a nonsensical one. Aristotle noted long ago that one process may find its actualization in another. So, that teaching is completed in learning and that caring is completed in reception by the cared-for should be neither incredible nor incomprehensible. We may still say, "I care," when we are prepared to care, and not every failure of caring is one to which blame attaches. But in recognizing that my use of "I care" in the incomplete relation is an ellipsis of sorts, I acknowledge that I am not alone—not solely to be credited or blamed—in the caring relation.

Logically, we have the following situation: (W, X) is a caring relation if and only if

- i) W cares for X (as described in the one-caring) and
- ii) X recognizes that W cares for X.

When we say that "X recognizes that W cares for X," we mean that X receives the caring honestly. He receives it; he does not hide from it or deny it. Hence, its reception becomes part of what the one-caring feels when she receives the cared-for. We do not need to add a third condition and a fourth, as in, "W is aware that X recognizes," "X is aware that W is aware that . . .," and so on.

Caring requires the typical engrossment and motivational displacement in W and, also, the recognition of caring by X. Now, of course, the relationship can be mutually (or doubly) caring if we can interchange W and X and retain true expressions. This seems the correct logical analysis of caring, and it has the merit that it accounts for the ambivalence that may arise in such a situation. By that, I mean that it allows me to say "I care for X," even if I must admit that (I, X) is not a fully caring relationship.

### RECIPROCITY

We must turn now to a problem that will draw our attention repeatedly—that of reciprocity. Later, we shall be concerned with it in connection with caring for ideas, creativity, and intuition. Right now we are concerned with reciprocity in terms of the contribution of the human cared-for. We have already noted that the cared-for must "receive" the caring. But what is the nature of this reception?

What part does the cared-for play in caring? Clearly, in equal meet-